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Abstract—This paper deals with a systematic way for 
modelling and visualising market power in liberalised electricity 
markets. 
The paper first introduces a new index termed the “Nodal 
Market Power” index, the NMP index. The NMP index is 
calculated based on the concept of “social welfare” in economics 
and the game theory in applied mathematics. The oligopoly 
electricity market is modelled through a non-cooperative game 
and the solution concept of the Nash equilibrium. The solution 
concept of Nash equilibrium is reformulated as an optimisation 
problem. To tackle the multiple Nash equilibria problem, the 
worst Nash equilibrium in terms of the social cost to the society is 
selected. Then after, the NMP index is calculated for each node of 
power system. A colour contour map is used for visualising the 
market power using the NMP index. 
 
Index Terms—Market Power, Stackelberg-Worst Nash 
Equilibrium, Nodal Market Power Index 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ARKET power of a producer is the ability to profitably 
maintain market prices above competitive levels for a 
significant period of time, [1]. In economics, for a firm to 
have market power, two elements must be present:  
• First, the firm must have the ability to influence the 
market price by varying its own output; and 
• Second, in doing so, the firm must be able to earn excess 
returns in the medium or long-term, [2]. 
A firm which has no influence over the market price is said to 
be a price taker and is not deemed to have market power.  
 
The exercise of market power in electricity market involves 
reducing output in order to raise the market price and thereby 
earn even higher overall profit on the remaining output. This 
has the following effects; 
• The price-duration curve is higher than in the absence of 
the market power; 
• The market price reaches the price cap more frequently 
and load shedding occur more frequently than in the 
absence of market power. 
 
The electricity market in California has shown that a 
supplier’s ability to exercise market power for a time period 
can damage the intended free competition in the electricity 
market. The experience with the restructured market has 
                                                          
 
shown that generation suppliers are in a much better position 
to exercise market power.  
There are two ways of exercising market power in electricity 
markets, (1) Financial withholding and (2) Physical 
withholding. The financial withholding means bidding 
excessively above the marginal cost of a generating unit in 
order to raise the electricity market price above the 
competitive levels.  
The physical withholding means that a generator bids a part of 
its capacity into the market to reduce the available supply in 
the market and drive up the market price, [3].  
The consequences of exercising market power are (1) profit, 
(2) wealth transfer, and (3) dead-weight loss. The profit as the 
first consequence is not only for the exerciser of the market 
power but it is for all suppliers. In fact, because of the high 
cost of exercising market power, the market power may 
become more profitable for those suppliers who do not 
exercise it.  
The wealth transfer from consumers to suppliers is another 
consequence of exercising market power. 
The dead-weight loss is the inefficiency resulting from 
monopoly power.  
Many factors can cause market power in the system. 
Dominant generators can dictate market price through 
economic withholding or physical withholding. Transmission 
system is another factor which may cause market power 
exercising in the electricity market.  
Flaws in the market design may lead to the exercise of market 
power by suppliers. 
 
Market power problems in liberalised electricity markets are 
more complicated than those in other markets. This is because 
electricity can not be stored in a large amount and therefore 
must be consumed when it is produced.  
Market power issues are explained in [5]-[12]. Measurement 
and assessment of market power in liberalised electricity 
markets are explained in [13], [14], and [15]. References [16], 
[17], and [18] deal with diagnosing market power and market 
power simulation. 
From the literature, three different approaches can be realised 
for modelling market power: 
• Market concentration analysis, 
• Benchmark price and actual market price, 
• Oligopoly equilibrium analysis, [19]. 
 
In this paper, we develop the notion of “Stackelberg-Worst 
Nash equilibrium” for market power modelling. The 
mathematical structure for calculating the Stackelberg-Worst 
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Nash equilibrium is derived. Based on the concept of 
Stackelberg-Worst Nash equilibrium, the Nodal Market Power 
index, NMP index, is introduced. The NMP index is a 
locationally differentiated index to model market power in the 
system. To visualise market power, a colour contour map is 
used. The colour contour map is made through a colour 
spectrum from dark blue to dark red which is assigned to 
range of NMP indices in the system. 
Section II of this paper deals with the mathematical 
formulation of the NMP index. In section III, the colour 
contour map is explained. Section IV implements the NMP 
index and the visualising process using the modified Garver’s 
example system. Section V concludes the paper.  
II.  THE MATHEMATICAL MODELLING OF THE WORST NASH 
EQUILIBRIUM AND THE NODAL MARKET POWER INDEX 
The graph of a marginal cost of a typical generating unit is 













Fig. 1 Stylised representation of the marginal cost of a generating unit 
 
In Fig. 1, ci ($/MW), and gimax (MW) are the variable cost, and 
the generating capacity of the generating unit i. (ĉi , ĝimax) is 
the price-quantity pair offered by the owner of generating unit 
i to the EMO. Pmin ($/MW) and Pmax ($/MW) are the minimum 
and maximum limits on ĉi. These limits are usually set by the 
electricity market regulator. GenCo r has two decision 
variables to maximise its profit. These variables are, offered 
price and offered quantity to the EMO for each generating unit 
owned by GenCo r. The mathematical structures set out in (1) 
and (2) model the profit maximisation problem of the GenCo r 
using bilevel programming. Given a set of strategies of all the 
other generators (that is, an offered price, and offered capacity 
availability, for each generating unit in each other GenCo’s 
portfolio), the best response for GenCo r is to choose an 
offered price, and offered capacity availability for each 
generating unit in GenCo r’s portfolio which satisfies (2): 
( )
( )( ) ( )












































































                                               (2) 
The optimisation problem in (1) is a bid-based, security-
constrained, economic dispatch. The economic dispatch 
results are calculated per modelled scenario of the system and 
factor σ is the expected number of these scenarios in the 
horizon year of planning. Optimisation problem (1) is a 
convex and linear programming problem on its own variables, 
g, d, θ, and fij.  
Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, the 
optimisation problem (1) can be written as a set of linear and 
nonlinear equations. Consequently, the structure (2) can be 
generalised as a classic nonlinear programming problem of the 
form (3). 
 
( )yxfMax rYy ,∈                                                                                      (3) 
 
Where in (3), y is the set of all decision variables in (2), Y is 
the feasible set of decision variables, and fr is the GenCo r 
profit function. We use the (3) notation to formulate the Nash 
equilibrium as an optimisation problem. 
 
The Nash equilibrium outcome of the strategic interaction of 
the GenCos depends on the nature of the strategies allowed to 
the generating units. There are two conventional approaches 
to modelling these strategies, [3], [19]: 
 
The Bertrand or Price Game: In this model, each GenCo 
offers a price for its product which maximises its overall 
profit, assuming that each other GenCos holds their own offer 
price fixed. The only decision variable for the GenCo is the 
offered price of its product. The offered quantity is assumed 
fixed at the GenCo’s true generating capacity. 
 
The Quantity or Cournot Game: In the Cournot model each 
GenCo chooses to offer a quantity to the market which 
maximises its profit, assuming that the other GenCos hold 
their output quantities fixed. The offered price is set at a fixed 
value, usually the true marginal cost.  
 
The Price and Quantity Game: In a typical liberalised 
electricity market, GenCos are able to select both the price and 
quantity which they offer to the market. To an extent, neither 
the Bertrand nor the Cournot games are able to fully reflect 
the full set of strategies available to a generator in a typical 
























Fig. 3 The strategy plane of GenCo r for its generating unit i 
 
The Nash equilibrium problem can be formulated as the 
problem of finding the zeros of a function M, [20].  
 
The set of Nash equilibria of the price-quantity game among 
GenCos can be expressed as follows: 
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We can conclude that the mathematical structure in (5) can 
calculate all Nash equilibria of the price-quantity game among 
the GenCos.  
 













































             (5) 
 
There are three possible outcomes for the game among 
GenCos: 
 
The game among GenCos has no equilibrium in pure 
strategies: In this case, the analytical methods are not able to 
model the strategic behaviours of GenCos. This paper 
assumes this case does not arise in practice. 
 
The game among GenCos has only one equilibrium: The 
unique equilibrium of the game can be found and used to 
model the strategic behaviours of GenCos. 
 
The game among GenCos has multiple equilibria: This case 
poses a problem. How should these multiple equilibria be 
handled?  
 
The problem of multiple equilibria is handled using the 
concept of the Stackelberg-Worst Nash Equilibrium 
introduced in [20]. The mathematical structure of the 
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Where in (7), NMPt is the nodal market power index for node 
t, Gt is the set of generators, and Dt is the set of loads 
connected to node t.  
III.  THE MARKET POWER VISUALIZING USING THE COLOUR 
CONTOUR MAP 
The NMP index is a locationally differentiated metric for 
market power cost in the system. The NMP index calculates 
the contribution of each node of system in total market power 
cost. Like node voltage, active and reactive power, a colour 
contour map can be used to visualise the NMP index.  
To create the colour-mapping, values of the NMP index were 
mapped to one of potentially 16.7 million different colours on 
computer monitor. This corresponds to a value of between 0 
and 255 for red, green, and blue. Figure 4 shows a common 


















 A B C D E F G H I 
Blue 127 255 255 255 127 0 0 0 0 
Green 0 0 127 255 255 255 127 0 0 
Red 0 0 0 0 127 255 255 255 127 








Fig. 4 Colour-mapping for Red = High, Blue = Low 
 
Possible action  
of GenCo r for its 
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All values below some minimum value are mapped to dark 
blue and all values above some maximum value are mapped to 
dark red. 
Using the above mapping curve, a colour contour map for 
visualising market power in the system can be plotted. 
This colour contour map can visualise the exercise of market 
power in the system. It also can be used for evaluating the 
impact of different policies on reducing market power in the 
system.  
 
In section IV, we use the modified Garver’s example system 
to assess the proposed methodology for visualising market 
power in the system. 
IV.  MODIFIED GARVER’S SIX-BUS EXAMPLE SYSTEM  
The key parameters of the system are presented in Tables I 
through III. 
 
TABLE I GENERATORS ‘DATA 
Generator gmax (MW) c($/MW) 
GenCo1 220 12 
GenCo2 460 20 
GenCo3 600 35 
Total 1280  
 
TABLE II RETAILERS ‘DATA 
Retailer dmax (MW) VoLL ($/MW) 
R1 80 20,000 
R2 130 40,000 
R3 40 10,000 
R4 160 30,000 
R5 115 50,000 
Total 525  
 
TABLE III TRANSMISSION NETWORK DATA 
Line# From To Reactance (Ohm) Limit(MW) 
1 Bus1 Bus2 0.004 40 
2 Bus1 Bus4 0.006 50 
3 Bus1 Bus5 0.002 60 
4 Bus2 Bus3 0.002 180 
5 Bus2 Bus4 0.004 50 
6 Bus2 Bus6 0.003 40 
7 Bus3 Bus5 0.002 160 
8 Bus4 Bus6 0.003 100 
 
The single line diagram of the example system is shown in 
Fig. 5. The competitive equilibrium results have been 
tabulated in Tables IV through V. 
The strategy plane of each GenCo consists of 10 actions. In 
each action, the price bid is set at marginal cost and the 
quantity bid varies from 10% to total generation capacity in 





























Fig. 5, The modified Garver‘s example system 
 
TABLE IV ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS UNDER COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
CONDITION 







1 0.00 156.67 80.00 12.00 
2 -5.73 - 130.00 24.00 
3 12.80 315.00 40.00 20.00 
4 -17.19 - 160.00 46.00 
5 -0.19 - 115.00 16.00 
6 -6.88 53.33 - 35.00 
Total/Installed 525/1280 525/525  
Average of Nodal Prices($/MW) 25.50 
Total Generation Cost ($) 10046.67 
Total Value of Lost Load($) 0.0 
CLP* : Competitive Locational Price 
 
TABLE V ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS UNDER COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
CONDITION 
From To Power Flow(MW) 
Bus1 Bus2 25.00 
Bus1 Bus4 50.00(congested) 
Bus1 Bus5 1.67 
Bus2 Bus3 -161.67 
Bus2 Bus4 50.00(congested) 
Bus2 Bus6 6.67 
Bus3 Bus5 113.33 
Bus4 Bus6 -60.00 
 
TABLE VI THE PRICE-QUANTITY OUTCOMES OF GENCOS 1, 2, 3 FOUND BASED 
ON THE WORST NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
 Original Network 
GenCo 1 ($/MW,MW) (12,220) 
GenCo 2 ($/MW,MW) (20,92) 
GenCo 3 ($/MW,MW) (35,120) 
Total offered capacity (MW) 432 
Total withheld capacity (MW) 848 
Total Generation Cost ($) 8,680 
Total Value of Lost Load ($) 2,543,333 
Total Social Cost ($) 2,552,013 
TNSP Cost ($) σ = 10.0 25,520,130 
 
The Nodal Market Power index, NMP index, for each bus is 





















Stackelberg-Worst Nash Equilibrium 
The NMP 
index ($) 
Social Cost in 
Competitive 
Market ($) 
Social Cost in 
Strategic 
Market ($) 
Bus1 1,880 136,040 +134,160 
Bus2 0.0 960,000 +960,000 
Bus3 6,300 401,840 +395,540 
Bus4 0.0 99,900 +99,900 
Bus5 0.0 950,000 +950,000 
Bus6 1,866 4,200 +2,334 
 
Fig. 6 shows the colour contour map of the Modified Garver’s 
example system. Dark red in the contour map represents high 
market power in the system and dark blue shows the low 




Fig. 6, The colour contour map for visualising market power in the modified 
Garver’s example system 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper deals with a mathematical structure for modelling 
market power in liberalised electricity markets. The 
mathematical structure is based on the concept of Stackelberg-
Worst Nash equilibrium. The Nodal Market Power index, 
NMP index, is defined as a locationally differentiated metric 
for market power modelling. Using the NMP index, a colour 
contour map is designed to visualise market power. In the 
colour contour map, the dark red represents the node which 
has the highest value of NMP index and the dark blue 
represents the node with the lowest NMP index. The proposed 
approach for modelling and visualising market power can be 
used for analysing the impact of different electricity market 
policies on market power. 
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